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This paper focuses on roots of strain in the European Monetary Union (EMU). It argues that 
there is need for a thorough reform of the governance structure of the Union in conjunction 
with radical changes in the regulation and supervision of financial markets. Financial 
intermediation has gone astray in recent decades and entailed a big bubble in the 
industrialized world. Waves of financial deregulation have enhanced systemic risks, via 
speculative behavior and growing inter-connectedness. Moreover, the EMU was sub-optimal 
from its debut and competitiveness gaps did not diminish against the backdrop of its 
inadequate policy and institutional design. The euro zone crisis is not related to fiscal 
negligence only; over-borrowing by the private sector and poor lending by banks, as well as 
a one-sided monetary policy, also explain this debacle. The EMU needs to complement its 
common monetary policy with solid fiscal/budget underpinnings. Fiscal rules and sanctions 
are necessary, but not sufficient. A common treasury (a federal budget) is needed in order to 
help the EMU absorb shocks and forestall confidence crises. A joint system of regulation and 
supervision of financial markets should operate.  Emergency measures have to be 
comprehensive and acknowledge the necessity of a lender of last resort; they have to 
combat vicious circles. Structural reforms and EMU level policies are needed to enhance 
competitiveness in various countries and foster convergence. The EU has to work closely 
with the US and other G20 members in order to achieve a less unstable global financial 









The sovereign debt crisis has created enormous anguish in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and emergency measures are used in order to prevent its breakdown. The European 
Council summit of October 2010 considered a Task Force report with a telling name: 
“Strengthening economic governance in the EU”. This document is to be examined in 
conjunction with the governance reform proposals issued by the European Commission and 
related documents. In March 2011,the Council adopted the Euro Pact and the European 
Parliament approved the 6 pack reform in the second half of 2011. But this demarche is not 
an attempt to explore a terra incognita. From the very beginning of the EMU there was some 
discomfort with its institutional underpinnings and there were misgivings regarding its 
optimality as a currency area. This explains why a train of thought underlines a political 
rationale, too, for its creation. Likewise, criticism over the way regulation and supervision 
were established in the Union is not of recent vintage. And insufficiencies of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), with almost all member states flouting its rules at various points in time, 
were repeatedly pointed out. This said, however, the flaws of financial intermediation have 
been less considered by policy-makers and central bankers for reasons which, partially, are 
to be found in a paradigm which has dominated economic thinking in recent decades. This 
paper focuses on roots of the huge strain in the Union and policy issues ensuing from the 
current crisis. Nota Bene: there is a “political reality” which constrains decisions in the EMU; 
the latter is not a federal structure and what appears to be rational when defined strictly 
economically may clash with implications of the political configuration of the Union.  
 
 
1. Roots of strain in the EU 
 
 
1.1 A Financial System Gone Astray 
 
Financial stability has staged a formidable comeback on the policy-making agenda in 
advanced economies. The current crisis has exposed flaws in the working of financial 
markets; this crisis cannot be explained only by years of cheap money and growing 
                                                        
1 The paper prepared for the CASE conference ‘The Future of European Integration”, Warsaw 18-19 November, 






imbalances in the world economy. Mistakes in macro-economic policy were accompanied by 
gross abuses of securitization, excessive leverage, abnormally skewed incentives and a loss 
of moral compass, inadequate risk-assessment models and failures to check for systemic 
risks, a breakdown of due diligence and an almost blind belief in the self-regulating virtues of 
markets.  
Structure is key in understanding the current crisis. On the one hand, it can derail even 
brilliantly conceived policies; on the other hand, it can shape policies wrongly. For instance, 
complacency vis-à-vis the expansion of financial entities overexposes economy to major 
risks (like it happened with Iceland,Ireland, UK, etc). Or take a premature opening of the 
capital account, as it occurred in numerous emerging economies, and the paradigm and 
policy approach which propounded total deregulation of financial markets as a means to 
foster economic growth.  
Financial intermediation, as it has evolved during the past decades proves that not all 
financial innovations are good, that inadequate risk and business models have been used by 
banks and other financial institutions. Quite a while ago warnings were sent regarding the 
growing opaqueness of markets due to securitization and off balance sheet activity. 
Lamfalussy (2000, p.73) noted that financial integration made “crisis prevention and handling 
it more difficult”; unregulated financial markets have turned into an in-built destabilizer.. 
Moreover, the financial industry has become oversized in not a few economies.  
The paradigm shift which is, currently, underway is rediscovering systemic risks: the 
complexity and inter-connectedness of financial markets, contagion effects, “Minsky 
moments”
2. But there is need to make here a distinction between two opposed cognitive 
approaches: one that believes that nothing can be done about the evolution of markets, 
whatever the way financial innovation goes; and another approach, which does not take the 
complexion of markets as God given and has misgivings about a range of financial 
innovations. Networks do not mushroom accidentally only; they are also shaped by policies. 
As Haldane, the director of research at the Bank of England remarked: “Deregulation swept 
aside banking segregation and, with it, decomposability of the financial network. The upshot 
was a predictable lack of network robustness…”(2009, p.31). 
                                                        
2These are moments when, according to Minsky, financiers lay waste to the economy. A Minsky moment comes 
after a long period of boom, after much speculation via borrowed money; it happens when over-indebted 
investors are desperate to sell good assets to pay back their loans, causing huge drops in financial markets and 
big surges in demand for cash. Paul McCulley of PIMCO concocted it to describe the Russian financial debacle of 





Prior to the financial crisis the European leaders failed to recognize the extent to which 
European banks were involved in the origination and distribution of toxic financial products. 
Financial sector practices have also obscured the size and dangers of the shadow-banking 
sector in Europe.  
This crisis is also one of deep financial integration, which the intensity of the sovereign debt 
crisis mirrors glaringly
3. In Europe, integration, with its financial component, was seen as a 
principal way to achieve catching up. And this approach entailed benefits, but it has also 
caused vulnerabilities, which are not to be linked with weak policies exclusively. For even 
countries which were quite prudent policy-wise and limited their external disequilibria were 
caught into the crisis maelstrom. Big bubbles and much investment in non-tradeable goods 
sectors occurred in several NMSs
4 following the opening of the capital account. Inadequate 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements operate in their case, too, against the backdrop of 
massive cross-border financial flows and the domination of local markets by foreign banks. 
Outside Europe and learning from previous crises, emerging economies tried to forestall 
shocks by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves as a buffer (a high premium was 
attached to them); uphill financial flows were seen as a purposeful cost for the build up of a 
wherewithal capacity in the advent of unanticipated shocks
5. Industrial policy aims, too, 
played a role in this respect.  
1.2 The EMU: sub-optimality and institutional and policy 
weaknesses 
 
Nowhere is the impact of structure more obvious than in the European Union, in the EMU in 
particular. For, in this area substantial cross border operations take place while national 
prerogatives in regulation and supervision, in tax and budget policies stay, basically, in 
national hands. In addition, the EMU is far away from an optimal currency area, as it was 
from its debut.  
Challenges for the functioning of the EMU are rooted in the economics of currency areas. 
The optimum currency area (OCA) theory
6 says that the adoption of a single currency pays 
off when the monetary area is highly integrated economically and has the capacity to adjust 
quickly to asymmetrical shocks. Traditionally there are five core OCA properties namely: 
                                                        
3  Reinhart and Rogoff’s observation that deep financial crises are followed by sovereign debt crises is quite 
meaningful in the case of a highly integrated monetary union (2009) 
4 A Bruegel publication highlights this type of capital flow into the Baltic economies, Romania, Bulgaria (Becker et 
al., 2010, especially chapter 2). 
5 There is, arguably, an optimal degree of financial integration in the global economy in view of destabilizing 
capital flows (see also Stiglitz, 2010). A legitimate question is what should be done in the EU about it, since 
unhindered capital flows are a rule of the game in the Union. 





wage and price flexibility, trade integration, cyclical convergence, factor mobility, and fiscal 
federalism, which are used to assess a success of an OCA area. In the EU wage setting 
continues to be done, predominantly, at the national level, and quite often at the sectorial 
level. This mechanism reinforces the relative inflexibility of the individual countries’ labour 
markets. Within the euro-area real wages have tended to be downwardly rigid with a 
relatively high level of indexation. Moreover, although nominal interest rates had largely 
converged, there was a wide discrepancy among real interest rates of the euro zone 
members. Although business cycles synchronization has increased within the euro zone 
countries, much of it had to do with the fall in the amplitude of global business fluctuations, 
which benefited from low interest rates and low inflation during the past decade. But 
considerable structural differences remain at the euro-zone country member level. European 
labour mobility remains fairly limited, despite persistent differences in regional 
unemployment. 
The current crisis has highlighted the inadequacy of existing institutional and policy 
arrangements and a stark fact: that not all problems have a fiscal origin (though they may 
end up, ultimately, as public debt). These arrangements have favored the accumulation of 
internal imbalances against the background of one-sided, inadequate policy tools. The “one 
size fits all” monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) could not prevent 
excessive capital, frequently of a speculative nature, flowing into less developed areas of the 
EMU, in the EU as a whole. Resource misallocation and bubbles were stimulated in this way. 
Likewise, an increasing entanglement of mutual exposure among financial entities
7 has taken 
place while burden-sharing arrangements in case of a failed entity were missing. After the 
crisis erupted the ECB has turned into a de facto unwilling lender of last resort to various 
governments, which have tried to prop up financial institutions, be it indirectly (by accepting a 
wide range of bank collaterals). Contagion effects have reinforced the sentiment that 
institutional and policy arrangements are more than precarious. Systemic risks, which have 
been engendered by “too big to fail” cases, have been compounded by effects of a “too big to 
be saved”
8 syndrome.  
The EMU is the only integrated area in the world which has a centralised monetary policy but 
favours a rather local (state) based approach to fiscal policy. The foundation for the latter 
was laid out in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which acts as a coordinating instrument. 
However, all EMU member states breached its rules. Because the financial crisis has had a 
                                                        
7  Banks outside of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain hold 2 trillion euro in debt instruments from these 
countries, which underscores the systemic risk to the financial system if one or more borrower countries fails 
(data compiled by Jacques Cailloux, cited by Kanter, 2010) 
8 The overexpansion of some financial entities has dwarfed the capacity of home states to intervene in order to 





very severe impact on national public budgets the very SGP rules have been put on the 
shelf. The cost of bank bailouts is quite staggering and the rise in public debts is pretty 
worrying
9. There are several issues for debate in this regard. One relates to what could 
evolve as an unsustainable indebtedness of the EMU area. If the cumulated budget deficits 
(in the EMU), together with private sector indebtedness,  turn into a substantial external 
current account deficit for the euro area as a whole, while its flaws persist, this situation 
would damage the status of the euro over the longer term
10. Although, one could doubt the 
viability of the euro zone, in its current configuration, unless its flaws are addressed in a 
timely manner. Another aspect of the debt problem regards the relationship between those 
economies, in the EMU, which are running surpluses on their current account (primarily 
Germany) and those which are running persistent large deficits (such as Portugal, Italy, 
Greece). This financial crisis has shown the internal tension which such an uneven 
distribution of competitiveness (as a lack of sufficient convergence) in the EMU creates
11. 
This inner major weakness has to be dealt with if the euro area is to avert highly damaging 
cracks. Given the existence of a common monetary authority, the ECB, and insufficient 
convergence in the euro zone, the argument for an EMU fiscal authority is compelling. This 
would create more room for manoeuvre for the mechanisms of fiscal transfers in the face of 
idiosyncratic shocks. It would also place less pressure on the ECB when dealing with 
regional divergences.    
The regulation and supervision of financial markets is a huge policy issue in the EMU, in the 
EU in general. The distribution of responsibilities between home and host country and the 
inexistence of detailed burden-sharing arrangements in the event of a crisis has been a 
major handicap for the single market under conditions of deep financial integration
12.Under 
current arrangements, responsibility for the stability of financial institutions belongs to the 
supervisor of the country where they are headquartered whereas responsibility for the 
stability of financial systems belongs to the supervisor of the host country. This crisis 
reinforces the idea that a common rulebook, more integrated supervision, and a common 
framework for crisis resolution are all needed to match the degree of financial integration. On 
the other hand, the burden-sharing issue prompts national governments and supervisors to 
                                                        
9 Apart from the effects of the current financial crisis (the cost of bail outs and big rises in government borrowing), 
another threat to sound public finances is the ageing of population. Reforms of the welfare systems are a must 
under the circumstances. Multi-annual budgetary frameworks are useful because they limit the scope for 
opportunistic government interventions in fiscal policy but adopting a longer-term vision for the EU public finances 
would require changes in the way fiscal policy is conducted. 
10 One would have to factor in the crowding out effect large public debts would exert on domestic business, which 
would damage private investment and, consequently, economic growth in the EU. 
11 For diverging competitiveness in the euro area see also “EMU at 10” (2008) 
12As the de Larosiere et al. (2009) report notes, ‘The absence of a sound framework for crisis management and 
resolution (with sufficiently clear principles on burden sharing, customers’ protection, assets transferability and 
winding up) complicates the introduction of an effective and efficient supervisory system to avoid financial crises 





think more along national lines, in view of their accountability toward national taxpayers. 
The bottom line is that, in order to function properly, be viable, the EMU should have solid 
fiscal/budget underpinnings; the latter would imply a common budget  (common treasury) 
and the issuance of joint bonds –like in federal states (US, Canada, Germany, etc) when 
seen as monetary unions. Likewise, a common regulation and supervision of financial 
markets does make sense in the EMU. In practice however, this is very difficult to achieve 
because of political reasons.  
1.3 EU Failures in Policy Action 
 
In the face of crises the European institutions have almost always had a reactive approach, 
doing just enough to fix the problem in the short term. But, most of the time, decision-making 
has been too little and too late. At the root of this cause are conflicting national interests and 
inadequate institutional and policy arrangements. The two previous notable European 
initiatives, the Lisbon Strategy and the SGP have both failed because rules enforcement was 
weak, not to say largely inadequate. With domestic interests at stake, peer governments 
loathed penalizing each other. Proposals of automatic sanctions, triggered in the event of 
breaching the rules, have been consistently ignored. Another reason why those initiatives 
failed is because they minimized the role of major discrepancies among member countries at 
various levels: structural, economic and political and the cost incurred to fulfill the stated 
objectives. 
The Europe 2020 Agenda aims at making up for past policy mistakes. In a global space 
where competition takes place, frequently, via zero-sum games, the EU economy has been 
consistently losing ground over the last decade. Although national policies do make a 
difference, the issue goes deeper than economics and concerns the whole range of values 
and norms embraced by a particular society. 
1.4 Redistribution of power in the world economy and global 
imbalances 
 
The Lisbon Agenda was enacted in 2000, as a EU response to Asia’s growing assertiveness 
in the world economy. This is a resuscitation of the Lisbon Agenda, which was hardly a 
success. But one of the lessons of the past decade is that national policies make a 
difference. The results of Scandinavian countries, of Germany in undertaking reforms with a 
view of improving competitiveness are a proof in this regard. 
Global imbalances enhance crises, which produce contagion effects. Can the EU push for a 





imbalances?  The EU would gain in persuasion and bargaining power in the G20 to the 
extent it can deal with its own problems effectively. Yet, conflicting views and interests 
among EU member states reduce its internal cohesion and harm its power projection 
externally.  
1.5 Policy lessons 
There are lessons which policy-makers need to learn from this crisis:  
-  price stability is not sufficient for securing financial stability 
-  fiscal prudency is not sufficient for securing economic stability;  
-  unless financial markets are properly regulated and supervised they pose 
enormous systemic risks; this is particularly valid in a deeply integrated area 
such as the EU; 
-  private sector over-indebtedness creates systemic risks when it involves “too 
big to fail” financial entities; 
-  ways have to be found so that private investors bear the risks they assume (for 
the rescue programs have increased moral hazard); banks (their share-holders, 
bond-holders) should not take for granted that whatever they do tax-payers’ 
money stays behind them; 
-  deep financial integration demands stronger regulation and supervision at the 
EU level; 
-  because of deep integration contagion effects hardly leave one immune to the 
effects of a crisis;  
-  the incompleteness of the policy regime in the EU and the EMU’s flawed design; 
-  deep financial integration collides with the reality of national tax prerogatives;  
-  policy coordination needs to take into account EU-wide interests;  
-  trustworthiness among member states is essential for the sale of preserving the 
common public goods;  
-  national policies do matter for improving competitiveness, even when the room 
of manoeuvre is quite limited; 
-  we live in an increasing uncertain world, which diminishes policy effectiveness 
and asks for “policy space” (which includes fiscal space) in order to cope with 









2. The EU Policy Response: crisis management and reforming 
the EU (EMU) governance 
 
 
The EU policy response to the financial and economic crisis has two components: 
I. A crisis management undertaking, which has tried to mitigate the economic downturn and 
avert a financial meltdown. The ECB has been compelled to take an active role in this, which 
has gone much beyond its usual mandate. This exercise is impaired, however, by conflicting 
views regarding the root causes of the euro zone crisis. And the inexistence of an effective 
lender of last resort (since the ECB is constrained in its operations and the EFSF is quite 
weak) has magnified a confidence crisis which has engulfed the euro zone.  
 
II. Measures aimed at reforming the EU’s economic governance. This component is multi-
faced and has several aims, namely: 
•  Fiscal consolidation by addressing the sustainability of pensions, health 
care and social benefits together with the adoption of national fiscal rules. 
•  Growth-enhancing structural reforms through higher employment and 
competitiveness 
•  The reform of the regulation and supervision of financial markets and 
restore the health to the financial sector. 
•  The set up of a permanent lending facility in the euro area-the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
The reform proposals package was adopted by the European Parliament in late 2011. The 
first three directions mentioned above form the object of the Euro Pact Plus(EPP)
14, which 
has already been agreed by the euro area heads of state jointly with several non-member 
states
15. Under the EPP proposals, each individual country would be responsible for the 
specific action it would choose to implement in achieving the commonly agreed objectives, 
monitored through a set of economic indicators. From a normative point of view the proposed 
measures could be seen as a step forward in improving the functioning of the euro currency 
area. But, big challenges remain. These relate to the implementation, coordination and 
enforcement of these measures as well as to filling in the gaps of the existing agreement. 
The basic flaws of the EMU are not yet tackled resolutely. The EMU needs proper fiscal 
                                                        
14The EPP is viewed by many as reflecting, basically, a Berlin view, but it also relies on proposals made by the 
European Commission and the task force headed by the president of the European Council, Herman van 
Rompuy. 
15These are Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden 





underpinnings and adequate regulatory and supervision arrangements of financial markets. 
The agreement to create the EFSF and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) answer a 
necessity but is insufficient. And the EFSF has proved to be quite ineffective as a crisis 
management tool, as a means to prevent contagion. There are several issues to be noted 
about the ESM.  
First, there is the issue of the individual member contribution to the ESM capital structure. 
Countries with lower credit ratings will end up paying up more to the ESM capital. Second, 
questions are raised over the perceived limited lending capacity of both EFSF and ESM. 
With Portugal being the third country, which asked for financial assistance in April 2011, the 
pressure has been moving to Spain and Italy. Under this scenario the existing EFSF lending 
capacity is strained much beyond the current limit. And its leveraging raises, itself, a host of 
technical problems. Third, the mechanism by which a loan guarantee is triggered in ESM 
places sudden pressures on domestic budgets in member countries, potentially worsening 
their budgetary positions.  
The view that the proposed sovereign debt default mechanism will make the EMU, as it is 
now, more prone to crises has been validated by events
16. A related problem is that the ESM 
could bring about another inconsistency, namely: the possibility of default, persistent 
imbalances and lack of proper fiscal arrangements (Munchau, 2010). This brings us back to 
square one, namely, the possibility of having a monetary union without solid fiscal (budget) 
underpinnings. Added to this is how to foster real economic convergence in the EMU. 
2.1The EMU design needs fundamental repair (deceptive euro zone 
aggregate deficits) 
  
European Central Bank (ECB) and Commission top officials note recurrently that the 
aggregate deficits of the euro zone (EMU) are inferior to those of the US and of other big 
countries (Japan is probably meant here since it has a public debt above 200% of its GDP). 
By this assertion they want to underline that the overall state of the euro zone is not worse 
than that of the US, or of other major economies; and that, consequently, it should not cause 
bigger worry. It is true that the US’ public debt, which has gone over 95% lately, is above the 
aggregate level of the EMU; and the latter’s budget deficit was ca. 6% of GDP in 2010, 
whereas the figure for the US exceeded 9% of GDP. However, these numbers need to be 
judged in conjunction with the roots of the euro zone crisis, of the sovereign debt crisis in the 
EMU. For, although the level of aggregate public debt does matter, the main cause of the 
euro zone crisis lies elsewhere, in its poor design. Until the eruption of the current financial 
                                                        
16Since it will introduce speculative dynamics into it, and an analogy is made with the Exchange Rate Mechanism 





and economic crisis, this flawed construction was obscured by cheap credit and cheap 
imports, by markets’ myopia.  
Economic history, of longer and recent vintage, teach us in this respect. Let us think of what 
differentiates the US and Canada, as federal structures, from the euro zone. A US sovereign 
debt crisis cannot be ruled out, in the long run, were its public debt continue to grow and 
markets lose confidence in the US dollar as a reserve currency. But an “American crisis” 
would rather occur as a massive depreciation of the USD, which would entail high domestic 
inflation. For the foreseeable future, US T-bills and bonds are among the safest investments 
in the world. Nobody assumes a disappearance of the US dollar, whereas not a few people 
are worried about the fate of the euro zone (and implicitly, of the euro), and various scenario 
are imagined in this regard. Moreover, markets have already priced in, more or less, tail 
events (default), contagion, linkages between sovereign debt and bank balance-sheets in the 
euro zone. Were an American state threatened by bankruptcy hardly anyone would doubt the 
existence of the US as a monetary union. Bank recapitalization in the US has proceeded 
better and more transparently than in Europe, and there are federal institutions for the 
regulation and supervision of financial markets across the Ocean. That their functioning has 
been inadequate, not least because of waves of deregulation (including the rescinding of the 
Glass Steagall Act of 1999 and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2001), is a 
different matter for discussion. The US “single market” functions better then in the EMU. 
Such examples can continue.  
A telling argument that markets do not pay much attention to EMU’s “aggregate” numbers is 
that, since the start of the current crisis, they have increasingly discriminated among the 
sovereign debt of euro zone member countries. The interest rate convergence of the past 
decade was, arguably, a market myopia, a market failure, which brought about over-
borrowing by state and private sectors and massive resource misallocation. This crisis has 
forced a wake up call, though this is happening with damaging overshooting, panics and 
vicious circles. Another question can be illuminating on aggregate numbers: how much fear-
mitigating would be a diminishing external deficit of the euro zone were it accompanied by a 
growing cleavage, competitiveness-wise, between Germany, the Netherlands and the 
periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy)in the euro zone? As this crisis shows external 
imbalances do matter in the EMU too. 
The very setting up of the European Financial Stability Facility(EFSF) proves the weakness 
of aggregate numbers as an argument.  An analogy could be made between TARP(Toxic 
Assets Recovery Program) in the US and EFSF. But TARP aimed at propping up financial 





are undisguised worries regarding the future of the EMU. Further, the very operations of 
ECB, of buying sovereign debt of member states, firm up the thesis that the EMU is lacking 
common fiscal (budget) underpinnings. The EFSF tries, inter alia, to relieve the ECB of an 
immense burden that has been bestowed on it as it operates as a “fireman”, much beyond its 
traditional mandate of preserving price stability. It appears, however, that the EFSF, be it with 
substantially bolstered resources and a broader range of operations (including bank 
recapitalization and sovereign debt purchases in secondary markets) would be an imperfect 
substitute to a solid budget arrangement. Anyhow, EFSF needs to beef up its firepower in 
order to deal with a crisis that is infecting Italy and Spain.  
Unfortunately, there is a major cognitive dissonance on fiscal (budget) integration among 
euro zone leaders. One approach, which is embraced by Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, 
etc sees euro-bonds as a culmination of a gradual process of integration, apart from political 
and legal impediments; the other approach sees euro bonds as an effective method to 
combat speculative attacks, and as a major step toward creating a solid fiscal complement to 
the common monetary policy
17. The fact that there are such conflicting views on this subject, 
the lack of capacity to make decisions in due time (as it happened constantly since the euro 
zone crisis has started), the precarious intervention tools the EMU has at its disposals, make 
the aggregate deficits-based observation unconvincing. It may be that the deepening crisis 
would force a radical change of outlook and action, and trigger a speedy pace of fiscal 
integration in the euro zone. If not, it is pretty hard to see how the euro zone will survive in 
the current configuration. Asking governments to deflate once and again, for the sake of 
closing down productivity gaps and reduce overall indebtedness, is arguably not sustainable. 
Structural reforms may look nice on paper, but actual results may be too time consuming and 
uncertain and, thereby, further damage the cohesiveness of the EMU. The attempts of 
various governments to reinstate the gold standard during the inter-war period, in the past 
century, gives plenty of food for thought on this matter. And, by the way, at that time 
governments could still use their own national monetary policy instruments.  
This crisis shows that incrementalism does not work. Fiscal rules are needed, as sanctions 
are. But fiscal rules are far from being sufficient; they cannot be a substitute for a solid fiscal 
arrangement, that must, arguably, include a common treasury. Appointing a finance czar for 
the euro zone, who should make judgments and recommend penalties, is not enough either. 
There are EMU countries (Ireland, Spain) that had pretty cautious budget policies and, 
relatively, low public debts before this crisis. And everything was blown out because of 
excessive borrowing on the part of the private sector, which invited a boom and bust cycle. 
                                                        
17A proposal made by the German Council of Economic Advisors indicates a shift in this direction (see Bofinger et 





The euro zone needs a rounded up common policy in order to survive. This policy would 
have to respond to asymmetric shocks, as it is done in the US and Canada via the federal 
budget, where unemployment insurance is provided; it would also have to deal with deep 
financial integration via a common regulation and supervision of financial entities as well as 
joint resolution mechanisms. For all this to operate there is need for fiscal integration, a 
common treasury. Even if Greece were to exit the euro zone in an orderly fashion and 
without entailing major contagion (is it possible?), the EMU would still need fiscal integration.  
2.2 Fiscal Consolidation 
The EU’s sovereign debt crises, which ensued from the financial and economic crisis, have 
heightened concerns for fiscal sustainability. Governments’ responses during this crisis and 
in other crises episodes show that, avoiding a systemic collapse necessarily entails 
burdening public debt. Thus, the policy of strengthened fiscal discipline should be seen in 
conjunction with policies addressing macroeconomic imbalances in the EU. A stronger SGP 
will be strengthened by improved surveillance and better data quality gathered from EU 
member states. The new system would rely on a much stronger compliance regime via 
“financial and reputational sanctions”. The introduction of fiscal rules, as set out in the SGP, 
in national legislation is expected to enforce compliance with the SGP rules – which have 
been so often broken in the past. 
The preventive arm of the SGP considers the sustainability of overall public debt, while the 
corrective arm targets a budget deficit path, which should bring down the debt to GDP ratio 
over time, in a consistent manner. The preventive component of SGP will limit public 
spending growth below the medium-term GDP growth until the target is met. It will also 
require that ’’best practice’’ budgetary procedures are implemented i.e. the adoption of multi-
year budget planning, overview of fiscal targets by independent fiscal councils, the 
implementation of fiscal rules and increased transparency in statistics. These are useful 
innovations, which are likely to strengthen the preventive arm of the SGP. 
However, there are changes to the corrective arm of the SGP, which would prove to be more 
challenging to implement in practice. The modification of the corrective component of SGP 
envisages the introduction of a 60% of GDP target for public debt, in addition to the 3% of 
GDP deficit limit. And, if public debt exceeded 60% of GDP, the country would be forced to 
bring it down at a pace of one twentieth of the excess over the previous three years
18. These 
changes could raise several problems in practice: 
                                                        
18A breach of either the deficit or debt limits would trigger an infringement procedure and a fine of 0.2% of GDP if 
the country fails to comply. Rejecting a penalty proposed by the Commission would need a qualified majority in 
the Council of Ministers, i.e. by ’’reversal voting’’. ’’Excessive imbalances’’ of other economic indicators trigger a 





¾  Requiring a country to bring down its public debt during recession may be self- 
defeating, owing to the pro-cyclical nature of debt to GDP ratios. 
¾  Since debt ratios are above 60% of GDP in most EU countries, collective action 
in reducing public debt could have a negative impact on the whole EU 
economic growth. 
¾  Meeting the objectives of the revised SGP in the absence of a workable 
framework for bank debt resolution and recapitalization could be challenging for 
all EU members. Both targets could be easily overshot in circumstances when 
some private institutions,deemed too big to fail, would need to be bailed out by 
national governments. 
¾  Countries with high debt/GDP ratio could face credibility problems in meeting 
the targets at the required speed, as their policies would face serious economic 
and social constraints. This could impact their borrowing costs for a long time, 
hampering their fiscal adjustment program. 
¾  The EC’s penalty system might not be credible as some of the indicators 
monitoredare not policy variables and thus cannot be controlled by government 
policy (Manasse, 2010). 
The EPP places a disproportionate weight on fiscal adjustment issues. But, fiscal indiscipline 
was not a cause of the crises in Ireland or Spain, for instance. Moreover, the risk of almost all 
EU countries behaving the same, i.e. enforcing the Maastricht criteria on public debt and 
deficit, could have a powerful recessionary bias in Europe. 
Except Hungary, NMSs do not have large public debts. But budget deficits have gone up 
dramatically in the wake of this crisis. Moreover, not a few NMSs were running meaningful 
structural deficits prior to the crisis, based on their existing economic growth model at the 
time. Consequently, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania have had to implement their 
fiscal consolidation programs because of the permanent loss of output and impairment of 
economic growth --against the backdrop of a highly unfriendly external environment that has 
been entailed by the turmoil in financial markets. But, as Becker et all (2010) note, fiscal 
consolidation has to take into account the risk of adding public deleveraging to the ongoing 
private deleveraging, a factor which could harm economic recovery. 
NMSs would benefit hugely from a high degree of absorption of EU structural and cohesion 
funds. These resources would offset the influence of expenditure reduction on aggregate 
economic activity while giving a boost to public investment in a period of economic distress. 
The availability of these resources would help prevent fiscal consolidation becoming pro-





arguably, not paid sufficient attention to the strategic role of EU structural and cohesion funds 
in this new context. 
For NMSs the introduction of fiscal rules is desirable, as it would discipline fiscal policy and 
remove, to a great extent, the influences of political business cycle on the economy. But, the 
limitation of budget deficit at 3% of GDP could be a serious constraint at times, given the 
nature of mandatory expenditure. For instance, it matters a great deal how contributions 
made to private pensions schemes, which are part of the pension system reform, are 
accounted for in the measurement of the structural budget deficit. The risk is that such 
legislative changes could be reversed in extreme circumstances if the degree of public 
endurance with fiscal reforms wears thin. 
2.3 Implement growth-enhancing structural reforms 
 
The EPP proposes two main areas where improvements could be made: labor market and 
competitiveness. It has to be noted that the same areas were singled out in need of 
enhancement in the Lisbon 2010 Treaty. However, progress in achieving those objectives 
was only marginal at best, in most of the EU economies. The new proposals aim at 
remedying this. But, in practice they could raise more problems and lead to growing 
discrepancies among EU economies. 
  2.3.1 Increasing Competitiveness 
 
The EPP suggests assessing wage and productivity developments by looking at relative unit 
labor costs (ULC) in euro area countries and their trading partners. Imbalances between 
costs and productivity are supposed to be resolved through wage control growth, product 
market liberalization, improvement in R&D, infrastructure and innovation as well as the 
business environment. 
There are problems with the way in which proposals have been made. First, the one-size-fit-
all logic applied across EU countries could have unintended consequences. Witness the 
effects that a single monetary policy had on EU peripheral economies during the boom 
years. Then, economies such as Spain or Ireland would have needed higher interest rates in 
order to prevent domestic macroeconomic imbalances building up. The same reasoning 
applies to the stated objectives of EPP on competitiveness. Initial conditions do matter and, 
an attempt to somehow correlate unit labor costs
19across EU member states using current 
                                                        
19There are various measures of competitiveness indicators, which often yield different results. Although 
proposals by the EPP suggest a range of ULC indicators to be used for various sectors of the economy, these still 
remain just one measure of competitiveness – most likely chosen because they facilitate comparisons across EU 





indicators as benchmarks, have the potential to lead to more destabilizing conditions in the 
future. Besides, economic growth is likely to slow further following the introduction of these 
measures, at a time when growth pick up is paramount for the success of country 
stabilization programs. 
Second, competitiveness is not a policy instrument, and it cannot be influenced 
unambiguously and directly by governments’ economic policy. The authorities could strive to 
create premises for an economy to develop but the ultimate outcome is a complex result of a 
market given context. NMSs, for instance, have traditionally benefited from lower labor costs 
but other factors such as inappropriate physical and skilled human capital in various sectors, 
or a low level of R&D impact adversely on their long-term competitiveness. Moreover, 
building up higher stocks of capital takes time and implies fast economic growth rates. For 
most NMSs a major policy issue is how to enhance resource allocation toward tradable 
sectors. For this crisis has revealed flaws of the precrisis growth model.  
Not least, the focus on ULC as a measure of a country’s competitiveness might be seriously 
misleading. Felipe and Kumar (2011) suggest that there are conceptual problems with it. If 
ULC are considered, then unit capital cost (UCC), that is the ratio of profits to capital 
productivity, would also have to be looked at. The authors show that capital productivity has 
been displaying a declining trend in the EU. Moreover, a ULC for tradable goods comparison 
across EU countries could be misleading because of the complexities of export products, 
which vary across the EU economies. NMSs tend to export lower value added and lower 
technology products while Germany, for example, exports over 12% of the world’s top 10 
most complex products. Thus, if Germany were supposed to provide a benchmark for 
competitive policies in the EU, based on ULC, it would in fact distort the whole picture and 
impose unfounded constraints on NMS’ policies. 
There would also be major implications for national policies, which are asked to undertake 
corrective measures. Governments could become more involved in the management of the 
economy, in mediating between social partners for the sake of achieving competitiveness 
targets. And as competitive devaluation can be damaging overall the same could happen 
with “competitive” wage controls throughout the EU. 
  2.3.2 Fostering Employment 
 
The EPP suggests each national state would have to implement policies aimed at increasing 
participation rate, lowering labor tax rates or increase lifelong learning. While from a 







outcome in the long term only. The labor market is far from being flexible across EU 
countries. Apart from labor market restrictions – which still apply to some NMSs such as 
Romania or Bulgaria, five years after they joined the EU – labor mobility within the EU 
remains low compared to the US for instance. Citizens of NMSs face relatively high migration 
costs, given their earning power. A uniform labor market reform across EU economies could 
have asymmetric effects as labor, being mobile, could shift towards most developed 
economies where wages are much higher. The richer EU countries are also devising means 
to attract highly skilled labor from poorer countries. 
2.4 Financial Sector’s Regulation and Supervision Reform 
European policy-makers are advancing with an overhaul of the regulatory and supervisory 
structures of financial systems, including the parallel (shadow) banking sector and rating 
agencies. Harmonization of rules is not a sufficient response to the crisis, since the very 
content of regulations and supervision needs radical change
20. A reformed regulatory and 
supervisory framework would observe basic principles such as regulation of all financial 
entities (including the shadow banking sector, hedge funds and private equity funds), higher 
capital and liquidity adequacy ratios, capping leverage, bringing derivatives into the open and 
having their trading regulated, preventing regulatory arbitrage, transparent accounting rules, 
and addressing systemic risk. 
In the EU there is need to strengthen the regulation and supervision of major financial 
groups, which operate cross-border. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) together 
with the new supervisory authorities should bring a decisive plus in this regard.  
In September 2011 Britain’s Independent Banking Commission released its report, which 
suggested that the financial system would be more resilient to future crises if banks’ retail 
were ring-fenced as against investment units. But this proposal comes short of the proposal 
put forward by Paul Volker, the former Federal Reserve Chairman, which suggested a 
complete separation between the two bank activities, as they were prior to the abrogation of 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. As a matter of fact, the “too big to fail” issue is still 
unaddressed by policy-makers and, ironically, the unfolding of the financial crisis has 
resulted in bank consolidation, which entails a heightened moral hazard problem (Johnson 
and Kwak, 2010)
21 . Global competition and the fear of regulatory arbitrage are not 
peremptory arguments in this respect. The persistence of this problem rather reflects the 
                                                        
20This is what comes out prominently from the de Larosiere et al. (2009) report and the Turner (2009) report (in 
the UK), from documents of the European Parliament and directives of the European Commission, the Monti 
(2010) Report, etc. 
21As put by Goldstein and Veron (2011) this issue is more challenging in Europe owing to a higher concentration 
of banking markets than in the US, general reluctance to let banks fail, the interdependence between banking and 





power of vested interests. 
One large component of the policy response namely consistent public sector bailouts of the 
private sector, notably of the banking sector, continues to pose more questions than it 
solves. The cross border structure of European bank operations and the years of resource 
misallocation have left many banks in Germany, France or Austria with a heavy exposure to 
peripheral EU countries and NMSs, i.e. those countries which now undergo painful 
adjustment programs. There is now a vicious circle emerging in which the refinancing of debt 
from countries with lower credit ratings is being done indirectly by those euroarea member 
countries which have a solid interest in protecting the health of their national commercial 
banks’ balance sheets. But the onus of adjustment is almost entirely put on the taxpayers of 
the countries in distress, which raises a host of practical and moral issues. A legitimate 
question therefore arises: is such an arrangement appropriate and sustainable (does it take 
into account the need for burden-sharing
22?). 
The EU can acknowledge an insolvency problem and come up with some form of debt 
restructuring for distressed sovereigns whose public debt is on an unsustainable path
23; it 
would imply a restructuring or even closing down insolvent European banks
24 (until recently 
stress tests performed across European banks have failed to incorporate extreme scenarios, 
such as default by a member state, simply because such a default is perceived to be 
politically inconceivable and would trigger powerful contagion effects). This option would also 
go some way in addressing the so-called ‘burden sharing’ issue among EU countries, since it 
was the banks from creditor EU members which provided loans that subsequently turned 
bad, in the first place
25. Clearly, such an action asks for a political decision in the EU donor 
countries, in Germany in particular
26.  
The 50% haircut applied to Greek sovereign debt is a breakthrough in this regard and forces 
banks to build up their capital, but it also creates a precedent in terms of capacity to contain 
                                                        
22Burden sharing can be seen through two pair of lenses. One regards whether private investors (bond-holders) 
share into the costs of debt restructuring. The other one refers to the distribution of costs among EU member 
countries. Hence arises the political sensitivity of this issue. Both perspectives imply the impact of an eventual 
sovereign debt restructuring on banks’ balance sheets.  
23The prevailing common view at various EU institutions, including the ECB, is that a country, which commits itself 
to a credible adjustment program, cannot be considered insolvent and thus should not be placed in a position to 
restructure its debt. What the ECB has seemed to fear mostly is contagion brought about by a sovereign debt 
restructuring, be it done in an orderly manner. 
24 See also Darvas, Pisani Ferry and Sapir (2011) 
25The possibility of adoption of collective action clauses (implying haircuts) by euro-area members, involving 
agreements between debtors and creditors over debt restructuring, has been explored at the European level (see 
BiniSmaghi, 2010) 
26For the political and social climate, which goes against such a solution, see also Guerot and Leonard(2011). 
The spectacular political advance of the “True Finns Party” in Finland speaks volumes about the contradiction 





contagion. For sovereign debt restructuring
27, however orderly it can be, may not prevent 
contagion, which would have its cost open-ended. This is, arguably, what the ECB fears 
mostly in a rushing of things. But putting off the day of reckoning may not be less costly.  
The crux of the matter seems to be how to make private investors accept haircuts while 
reopening financial markets to the countries in financial distress by making their adjustment 
programs as credible as possible. This is a catch-22 dilemma. Coping with this dilemma 
brings the issue of fundamental repair of the EMU design to the fore (see 2.1). 
2.5 Dealing with global imbalances 
The current crisis has reinforced one of Keynes' intellectual legacies, which was enshrined in 
the Bretton Woods arrangements —namely, that highly volatile capital flows are inimical to 
trade and growth and that financial markets are inherently unstable. As a matter of fact 
restraining financial flows is a way to solve the impossible trinity, which says that an 
autonomous monetary policy, stable exchange rate and free capital flows cannot be 
achieved concomitantly
28. The increasing number of emerging economies which resort to 
capital controls (in order to stem speculative flows) is quite telling about actual dynamics in 
the world economy. The IMF’s policy turnaround in this respect is also noteworthy. 
 
 
3. Issues Pertaining to NMSs 
 
3.1 Financial stability in NMS
29 
Financial stability in NMSs relates to, on one hand, crisis management in the euroarea and, 
on the other hand, to specific concerns. Crisis management in the euroarea gives a very high 
profile to contagion. Let us keep in mind that financial markets in NMSs are heavily 
dominated by foreign groups and their economies are significantly ‘euro’-ised. 
There are several means to enhance access to liquidity and mitigate solvency threats at a 
supra-national level; many of remedies have been implemented during the crisis: rules on 
convergence of deposit guarantees, which should prevent beggar-thy-neighbor policies; 
medium-term financial facilities; IFIs credit lines and investments. Two avenues to improve 
the EU’s support to NMSs deserve discussion: swap lines between the ECB and central 
                                                        
27 Debt restructuring distinguishes between reprofiling of bonds, with their maturity extended, and write-downs 
(haircuts) on the value of the debt. The latter would impact significantly on not a few banks’ balance sheets, which 
would need recapitalization. 
28 This is shown, analytically, by the Mundell-Fleming model. 





banks of non-euro area countries; a broadening of ECB range of accepted collaterals to 
national currency denominated bonds issues by non-euro NMS countries. These two 
measures, which would have helped to ward off euro liquidity shortages, were considered but 
not implemented at the height of the crisis.  
Preventing credit booms will be an issue again in NMSs, sooner or later. Instruments that 
can be used are: counter-cyclical capital and reserve requirements; dynamic provisioning 
against expected losses; limits on leverage and maturity mismatches; discretionary macro- 
prudential measures under the guidance of newly created macro-prudential supervision 
bodies such as the European ESRB. The difficulty for the NMSs is that this toolbox mostly 
applies to countries where credit is in the hands of national banks or autonomous local 
subsidiaries of foreign banks. It is not likely to be effective in countries where credit is mostly 
in the hands of foreign bank branches or lending can be outsourced to foreign entities of the 
banking group (i.e. the parent bank or a subsidiary in another country). Coordination among 
supervisors can be a response and should continue being developed but calling for 
coordination is no solution when institutions participating in it have different, possibly 
conflicting mandates and incentives. This is where the role of the ESRB comes prominently 
into the picture. 
NMSs cannot rely on capital controls as the single market prohibits such measures
30. 
Therefore, the risk of destabilizing capital inflows leading to credit bubbles has to be 
addressed through other means, which may include action on the demand for credit. 
Regulatory and tax instruments can, for example, be used to tame mortgage credit when 
deemed excessive from a macro- prudential point of view. All such measures, in order to be 
effective, would need to be adopted on a supra-national level. 
3.2 Euro Adoption 
The crisis in the euro area shows that removing the option of adjusting a nominal exchange 
rate may be very costly in terms of fiscal adjustment if it is not accompanied by efforts to limit 
excessive demand in the private sector, even if fiscal policy is broadly in order. However, 
limiting excess demand in the private sector is not easy to achieve for national governments 
that have surrendered their power over monetary policy in an environment with free capital 
mobility. It is noteworthy that housing and credit booms in Ireland and Spain, and in several 
NMS have been quite similar, suggesting that the fall in real interest rates as the result of 
financial integration and economic catching-up matters both inside and outside the euro 
                                                        
30As some countries use waivers to restrict what they consider to be destabilizing labor inflows a similar logic 
could apply when EU countries are faced with destabilizing capital inflows. Tax tools could be used in order to 





area. Euro outsiders should therefore be careful before fixing the exchange rate and should 
allow as much flexibility as possible on the way to euro adoption; they, in any case, should 
introduce measures preventing the emergence of unsustainable credit booms. But host 
country authorities may not be effective in this effort because of deep financial integration. 
However, they are not completely impotent: measures such as dynamic provisioning, using 
loan-to-value ratios, increasing minimum reserve requirements can provide buffers against 
excesses. 
The crisis in the euro zone, in particular, the competitiveness problems of Spain, Portugal 
and Italy and the inability of these countries to adjust their competitiveness inside the euro 
area highlights a big policy issue: Should the criteria for the optimal currency area (OCA) be 
fulfilled ex ante, i.e. before a country enters the euro area, or is it sufficient to expect that 
they will be fulfilled ex post, i.e. euro admission will create structural changes in the economy 
that will make the country suitable to the monetary union, even if it had not been before? The 
inability of southern EMU countries to adjust to competitiveness pressures inside the Euro 
zone indicates that it is wise for euro aspirants if OCA criteria are satisfied ex ante and there 
are policy instruments to guide the eventual need to adjust real exchange rate divergences 
ex post.  
The NMSs form a multi-colored cluster; some of them are better integrated in EU industrial 
networks and show balanced trade accounts, while others (including Romania) have skewed 
trade imbalances and much of capital inflows went into non-tradable sectors. Therefore, their 
chances of joining EMU are not similar. 
3.3 Tax Harmonization Across the EU 
One proposal of the EPP is for the EU members to explore the opportunity for tax 
harmonization. Agreeing to corporate tax harmonization across EPP countries, for instance, 
would go against the competitiveness concept. Removing incentives based on different 
taxation systems would be a major setback for less developed EU countries, such as NMS, 
in their efforts to attract investment. Tax competition policies are an important instrument in 
countries, which are involved in the catching-up process and thus need to build up capital 
because it is a useful tool in luring foreign investment. 
 
3.4 The Threat of Low Equilibria and Pitfalls of a One Size Fits All 
Economic Policy 





depends on massive external borrowing and inattention paid to resource allocation. In some 
NMSs much of investment went into non-tradable sectors, which created the framework for 
unsustainable growth and hid structural budget deficits. Very painful corrections of 
imbalances are underway in several NMSs. These adjustments need to consider a changing 
international (European) context regarding credit terms, capital flows, trade competition, 
investing in education and, not least, the challenge of enhancing the growth of tradable 
sectors when national policy is constrained by EU rules. 
The euro pact brings novelties regarding fiscal discipline and policy coordination. But unless 
it pays thorough attention to the needs of emerging (low income) EU economies the latter 
may get stuck in low equilibria situations (Portugal’s experience is quite relevant in this 
regard). EU funds absorption has to increase manifold in order to help develop their 
infrastructure, raise fixed capital investment in tradable sectors. Would foreign banks that 
operate in these countries change their lending proclivity and be more forward oriented as 
stakeholders? It is true that there is a sort of economic recovery in NMSs and some of them 
are bouncing back impressively by relying on exports. But sustainable high economic growth 
rates, liable to achieve convergence, ask for much more as a recipe for economic catching 
up. One should also bear in mind significant differences among NMSs; some of them (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland) are better integrated in European industrial 
networks and perform better trade-wise.  
The threat of being caught in a region of low equilibria has to be judged in conjunction with 
pitfalls of a one size fits all economic policy. For example, very low inflation (as Maastricht 
criteria demand) is pretty hard to obtain in an emerging economy
31; it could even constrain 
growth. Or take the policy guideline of imposing limits to current account deficits (in the 
vicinity of 5% of GDP) in the countries that signed up to the EPP. If FDI is substantial and 
goes prevailingly into tradable sectors there should not cause much worry; in such a case a 
current account deficit which may go beyond 10% of GDP is not an unwelcome imbalance.  
 
 
4. Other Issues to Ponder On 
 
 
Disentangling private from public debt has become an overwhelming issue in the EU in view 
of its deep financial integration. Private sector (bank) debts are making up enormous 
contingent liabilities on public debts when bankruptcies are not tolerated (not to mention the 
                                                        
31Not least because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect and the prospects of further rises in the relative price of 





moral hazard problem). This is one of the revelations entailed by the current crisis. And the 
inability to disentangle the myriad of intertwined debts will impact, negatively, on fiscal 
policies for years to come. Even now this feature of deep financial integration seems to be 
under-estimated by some. What is worrisome is that bank consolidation would preserve the 
hostage relationship governmental budgets are held into. Ways must be found to make sure 
that a golden rule of market economy operates, namely, that investors bear the risks they 
assume and losses are not socialized
32.  
Fiscal rules, surveillance and peer pressure are not enough for strengthening the cohesion of 
the EMU, of the EU in general. A handicap in the EU is linked with the political reality that 
taxpayers are, ultimately, national citizens. Can “common goods” (including the euro) be 
protected unless “common resources” (the EU budget?) are more substantial? Can 
resolution schemes and orderly restructuring schemes of sovereign debts be devised so that 
they compensate the smallness of the EU budget and complexity of the EU decision making 
process? Can the EU policy-makers use additional instruments in order to foster more real 
convergence in the EMU, in the EU as a whole? Is there room for strengthening policies at 
EU level? 
Were this crisis come to an end, would a deflationary bias in the conduct of monetary policy 
appear in view of the willingness to prick bubbles in their infancy? On the other hand, would 
not it, by fostering less instability, support long-term growth? In a way, answering this 
question is analogous to deciding on a proper speed of implementing Basel III: for a too fast 
implementation could stifle recovery; on the other hand, a too slow implementation would 
create prerequisites for a new crisis.  
Does size matter for judging fiscal risk? It appears it does. Large economies are, seemingly, 
considered to have a bigger capacity to resists shocks; they are, potentially, more resilient. 
Resilience (ability to withstand external and internal shocks) will increasingly be a principal 
policy aim in the years to come. 
What would be the impact of new technology for circumventing rules (ex: high-frequency 
trading)? Regulators and supervisors need to take it into account as well, when thinking 
about financial stability. The latter can be linked also with the capacity of economy to 
withstand effects of natural disasters, with social strain. Demographics, too, play in a role 
when it perturbs inter-generational balance and, consequently, fiscal equilibria.  
The years to come will quite likely be accompanied by an increasingly uncertain 
environment; complexity will also be on the rise. These circumstances advocate a more 
simple, resilient financial intermediation system, for the sake of its own stability. If this does 
                                                        
32“…the current imperfect world where bondholders of banks and nations are shielded from suffering any pain 





not happen and global imbalances persist, more fragmentation is to be expected, with 
societies turning, probably, more inward looking. This will have profound implications for the 
global system. It may be that, in view of the lessons of financial crises and of the need to 
lend to economies more resilience, there is an optimal size of openness (trade and finance-
wise). This implies that firms need to think globally and operate selectively as a means for 
mitigating risks
33. It may also be the case that we will end up with a three blocs-based 
financial system as a means to maintain a relatively open global system. 
“Japanization” of EU economies is a distinct possibility in view of the legacy of this terrible 
crisis and power redistribution in the global economy. One should also bear in mind the 
erosion of the middle class that has been taking place during the last couple of decades in 
the US and in numerous European countries; this process complicates adjustment and 





Structure  and  networks are key in understanding the roots of the current crisis and the 
tension in the EU (EMU). Such a perspective reinforces the rationale for a reform of the EU 
economic governance and a radical overhaul of the EMU institutional and policy 
arrangements. As this crisis indicates it is not only fiscal rules and their compliance with that 
a proper functioning of the EMU hinges on. Flaws of financial intermediation, growing 
imbalances stemming from the dynamics of private sector saving and investment flows, 
inadequate regulation and supervision of financial markets, and, not least, inadequate budget 
arrangements (the lack of a common treasury and missing instruments in combating 
asymmetric shocks) have played a major role in triggering the sovereign debt crisis in the 
EMU. The overexpansion of financial institutions and their investment behavior are to be 
highlighted as well. Consequently, a reform of the EU economic governance has to deal with 
fiscal rules and compliance, macroeconomic disequilibria and competitiveness gaps, the 
regulation and supervision of financial markets; the design of the EMU needs to be 
thoroughly remade. In the meantime, firm crisis management has to be used in order to 
prevent a break down of the euro zone. The need to tackle global imbalances and overhaul 
international arrangements is to be mentioned in this context.  
                                                        
33Other catastrophic events (like the Fukushima disaster) highlight the risks of over-dependency on various 





Fostering real economic convergence remains a huge challenge in the EMU, in the EU as a 
whole. A threat for the EMU is a growing cleavage between its northern tier and its southern 
tier, with the latter becoming, possibly, mired into vicious circles, incapable of overcoming the 
impact of fiscal consolidation in a hostile external environment
34. Another chasm could 
deepen between older EU member states and some NMSs. Can Europe 2020 provide a light 
in this regard? NMSs have a deep stake in EU governance reform since they cannot escape 
the impact of EU wide externalities and the functioning of their economies depends on the 




34  A sort of “Mezzogiornification” of the South of the EMU, but with more tensions than those envisaged by 
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